Phishing platform Rockstar 2FA journeys, and “FlowerStorm” picks up the items – Sophos Information

Phishing platform Rockstar 2FA journeys, and “FlowerStorm” picks up the items – Sophos Information


Editor’s word: Sophos MDR’s Johua Rawles, Mark Parsons, Jordon Olness, and Colin Cowie contributed to this report.

 

One of many Web’s most prolific cybercrime-as-a-service operations not too long ago suffered a setback: In November, Sophos MDR observed that detections for the Rockstar2FA “phishing-as-a-service”(PaaS) platform had all of the sudden gone quiet.

Based mostly on telemetry gathered by Sophos MDR, it seems that the group working the service skilled at the least a partial collapse of its infrastructure, with pages related to the service now not reachable. This doesn’t look like due to a takedown motion, however as a result of some technical failure on the backend of the service.

The disappearance of Rockstar2FA, an up to date model of phishing providers generally known as DadSec (beforehand related to Microsoft’s Storm-1575 risk group) got here two weeks earlier than TrustWave printed analysis detailing the phishing-as-a-service operation. Components of the phishing service’s infrastructure are actually now not reachable, returning an HTTP 522 response— indicating that they had been lower off from the Cloudflare content material supply community. Telegram channels related to command and management of the service additionally seem to have gone offline.

Within the weeks following  the disruption of Rockstar2FA, we noticed a surge in the usage of an identical set of PaaS portals which have been tagged by some researchers as “FlowerStorm”—the title coming from the usage of plant-related phrases within the HTML web page titles of most of the phishing pages themselves (“Flower,” “Sprout, “Blossom,” and “Leaf,” for instance). FlowerStorm shares numerous options with Rockstar and with Tycoon, one other Telegram bot-powered PaaS platform.

So, you need to be a rock star

Rockstar2FA is (or maybe was) a PaaS package that mimics professional credential-request conduct of generally used cloud and software-as-a-service platforms. Would-be cybercriminals buy and management phishing campaigns by means of Telegram and are given a novel phishing web page and URL to make use of of their marketing campaign.  Visits through the hyperlink delivered to the goal delivered the phish; visits to the area of the location itself are routed to a “decoy” web page. Rockstar’s decoy pages often had an automotive theme.

A screenshot of a Rockstar2FA "decoy" page, a fake auto dealer site.
Determine 1: A Rockstar2FA “decoy” web page

Guests to the URL could be routed to a counterfeit Microsoft login web page. That web page captured credentials and multifactor authentication tokens and despatched them through an HTTP POST message to an adversary-controlled “backend server” web page —a PHP web page with a seemingly random quantity for its title (as proven in Determine 2). These back-end servers had been largely on .ru, .de and .moscow registered domains. The decoy pages had been regularly hosted on the identical hosts because the back-end servers.

Screen shots of the developer view of Chrome showing web requests sent from a Rockstar2FA phishing portal.
Determine 2: HTTP POST information despatched from a Rockstar2FA phishing web page to a backend server on a .ru area (proven in Chrome developer device view)

A lot of the phishing pages had been on domains registered within the .com, .de, .ru. and .moscow top-level domains. At any given time, the Rockstar2FA service used about 2,000 domains throughout these and different TLDs.

A pie chart showing the distribution of top-level domains the 10 most heavily used domain names were registered with. A third were .ru, a fifth were .com.
Determine 3: Distribution of Prime 10 Rockstar2FA phishing domains by TLD

Nonetheless, beginning no later than June 2024, a few of these pages used Cloudflare Pages serverless deployment (utilizing the area pages[.]dev), together with code deployed as Cloudflare employees (on the area employee[.]dev), whereas nonetheless counting on backend servers for exfiltrating phishing information. These phishing pages used subdomain names that didn’t look like created with a website era algorithm (DGA)—as a substitute, they seem to have been manually typed by the operator of the package. Some had been crafted to emulate particular goal domains (as with 4344655-proofpoint-online-secure.pages[.]dev). However others had been just like keyboard spam:

  • whenyoucreatanydominsamedominusedturnslite.pages[.]dev
  • pppaaaaulhaaaammmlinnnnbuiiildddeeeerrsssssnzzzzzozzzz.pages[.]dev

These domains made up solely a small variety of the general URLs associated to Rockstar, and had been usually related to the phishing portals themselves.

A bar chart showing the distribution of TLDs and number of URLs detected per month for Rockstar2FA. The number of .ru domains decreased significantly over time.
Determine 4: New Rockstar URL detections by day from Might 24 to November 12, grouped by top-level area. The usage of .ru domains shrank over time because the marketing campaign progressed, and use of .com TLDs expanded. November information ends at November 12 when new detections dropped off. The usage of pages.dev was restricted to a handful of hostnames per thirty days.

Technical difficulties

On November 11, the infrastructure of Rockstar2FA all of the sudden was disrupted. Redirects to decoy pages failed, yielding a Cloudflare 522 error, indicating that the server offering the web page was now not in communication with Cloudflare.

A screenshot of a failed connection error for a Rockstar decoy page.Determine 5. A failed connection to a decoy web page area

Moreover, the portal pages started to fail. Whereas clicking the Cloudflare “I’m human” check beforehand resulted in a counterfeit Microsoft login portal being loaded, now all that loaded was the animated Outlook brand. The rest of the script for the portal pages fails as a result of the connection to the back-end server (through a POST request) has been severed.

A screenshot of an animated Office365 logo for Outlook used by Rockstar's phishing portal pages.
Determine 6: The Microsoft Outlook animated brand proven by the now-failing phishing package

The identical was true for pages[.]dev hosted portal pages, which additionally hung whereas attempting to hook up with the back-end URLs. Since November, we’ve got continued to see new phishing portal pages arrange on pages[.]dev subdomains, however all of them fail to hook up with their backend servers.

A screenshot of a Chrome developer view of a Rockstar pages.dev phishing portal failing to connect to a backend server.
Determine 7: A failed POST request to a Rockstar2FA backend server

This implies that the operators are persevering with to wrestle to get their infrastructure again on-line. This can be due to a webhosting downside or another technical challenge plaguing the Rockstar2FA operators. The truth that the Telegram bots used to run the service additionally look like down suggests there may be some bigger form of disruption to the operation.

The rising rock star (?): FlowerStorm

Inside a couple of week and a half of the interruption of Rockstar, we noticed a surge in exercise from FlowerStorm, although we additionally discovered many of those websites had been being disrupted as effectively. The FlowerStorm PaaS platform has been energetic since at the least June of 2024.

Wanting on the conduct of FlowerStorm samples, we discovered that the portal used the identical URL to ship an authentication request for the goal as utilized in communication requests to the “backend portal”—on this case, to a backend server using the file “subsequent.php”.

 

A screenshot of data abouit and
Determine 8: An HTTP request from the FlowerStorm phishing web page

 

On this case, the identical IP deal with utilized for the credential harvesting was additionally used for the authentication to the person account, based mostly on EntraID sign-in logs.

Figure 9: the EnteraID log for a sign-in by the adversary-in-the-middle script on the phishing service’s back-end server.
Determine 9: the EnteraID log for a sign-in by the adversary-in-the-middle script on the phishing service’s back-end server.

The phishing pages’ communication to the backend servers PHP file utilized the anticipated fields and communication beneath:

Area Descriptions and Anticipated Values

Area/Occasion Description Worth/Instance
Do Specifies the motion being requested. “verify” – For verify operation “login” – For login occasion
CheckVerify Periodic server verify for authentication methodology standing. – do: “checkVerify”- token: – person: – service: “notif”- key:
e-mail Person’s e-mail deal with.
move Person’s password, required when do is “login”. base64_encoded_password
token JWT containing session data.

Anticipated Responses and Interpretations

Motion Response Description
verify { “standing”: “success”, “banner”: null, “background”: null, “federationLogin”: “”, “sort”: “workplace” } Signifies a sound e-mail and points a token.
login { “standing”: “confirm”, “message”: “Please confirm your account”, “methodology”: “”, “token”: “”, “key”: “”, “person”: “” } Prompts for MFA utilizing the identical JWT for session monitoring.
Methodology { “standing”: true, “information”: “”, “quantity”: 59 } Posts session-specific information used for MFA.
Methodology (Knowledge Decoded) [ { “authMethodId”: “PhoneAppNotification”, “data”: “PhoneAppNotification”, “isDefault”: true }, { “authMethodId”: “PhoneAppOTP”, “data”: “PhoneAppOTP”, “phoneAppOtpTypes”: [“MicrosoftAuthenticatorBasedTOTP”] } ] Particulars multi-factor authentication strategies obtainable to the person.
CheckVerify (Failure) { “standing”: false, “message”: “Verification failed”, “token”: “” } Server begins checking for MFA acceptance.
CheckVerify (Success) { “” } MFA was accepted, response comprises session cookies for authentication.

 

Not all of the phishing pages make the most of the identical backend server construction. Some portals will make the most of a subsequent.php hosted on the identical area because the phishing touchdown web page. The IP deal with in EntraID authentication logs is not going to be the identical for these portals. For instance, within the case beneath, the phishing web page protectivewearsupplies[.]doclawfederal[.]com/wQBPg/ sends its put up request to a special host with the identical area title:

Figure 10: the HTTP header data for a phishing page’s backend server communications on a separate host
Determine 10: the HTTP header information for a phishing web page’s backend server communications on a separate host
Figure 11: A developer browser view of the phishing page protectivewearsupplies[.]doclawfederal[.]com/wQBPg/
Determine 11: A developer browser view of the phishing web page protectivewearsupplies[.]doclawfederal[.]com/wQBPg/

Rockstar2FA/ FlowerStorm similarities

FlowerStorm has a major variety of similarities to Rockstar2FA, each within the format of its phishing portal pages and the connection to its backend server .

Doc object mannequin

 

The HTML of FlowerStorm’s portal pages has modified over the previous six months however nonetheless retains an identical Doc Object Mannequin (DOM) content material to that of Rockstar pages. The HTML pages of older and newer FlowerStorm phishing pages, like these of Rockstar2FA, have strings of random, unrelated textual content in HTML feedback, use Cloudflare “turnstile” keys to immediate a verify of the incoming web page request, and produce other related constructions and content material, as proven beneath:

 

  New FlowerStorm Previous Rockstar2FA Previous FlowerStorm
Title OreganoLeaf Unalike Elderberry
Turnstile Sitekey 0x4AAAAAAA0_fAGSk-ZDbrja 0x4AAAAAAAhiG1SBeMjCx4fG 0x4AAAAAAAceMeRudDiJWXJJ
Type Submission Script FennelBlossom Nautili Bravery
Feedback Themes Literary/tutorial Automobiles, health, fruits Automobiles, life-style, fruits
Seen Safety Textual content “Initializing browser safety protocols” “Operating browser verification to guard your security” “Browser safety verification ongoing in your security”

The weather within the chart above are referred to as out within the screenshots beneath, displaying the HTML code of every of the phishing portals. The HTML doc title tags are highlighted with a crimson field, feedback are highlighted with orange, turnstyle key with yellow, the script operate title in inexperienced, and the seen “safety” textual content in blue. All seem to comply with the identical form of template for producing HTML, although the remark and title naming schemes reference completely different textual content arrays.

Figure12: The document object model of a Rockstar2FA phishing page
Figure12: The doc object mannequin of a Rockstar2FA phishing web page
Figure 13: The DOM of an older FlowerStorm phishing page (from June 2024)
Determine 13: The DOM of an older FlowerStorm phishing web page (from June 2024)

 

Figure 14: The DOM of a newer FlowerStorm phishing page; the algorithm generating the title and function names uses a combination of two botanical-themed words
Determine 14: The DOM of a more recent FlowerStorm phishing web page; the algorithm producing the title and performance names makes use of a mix of two botanical-themed phrases

 

Whereas abuse of the Cloudflare CDN’s safety turnstyles has been current in different adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits, the construction of FlowerStorm and Rockstar phishing portals suggests at the least a typical ancestry.

Credential harvesting

The strategies utilized by FlowerStorm for communication bear shut resemblance to the earlier Rockstar2FA portals, with some minor variation within the area names and responses:

Widespread Fields

  FlowerStorm Rockstar2FA Commonality
PHP Communication Subsequent.php .php Each talk to a backend server internet hosting a PHP file. Used for exfiltration and information communication.
Electronic mail Validation “do”:

“verify” for e-mail validation

“do”: “verify” for e-mail validation Each help e-mail validation as a basic characteristic.
Login Occasion “do”: “login” for authentication “do”: “le” for authentication Each facilitate login operations.
Password “move”: comprises base64 encoded password “px”: comprises plaintext password Each talk passwords to backend server.
Session Monitoring “token” for session monitoring. “sec” for session monitoring Each present session monitoring tokens.

 

Area Registration and Discovery

The patterns of area registration and the detection of recent pages by means of URLScan submissions for each phishing kits’ infrastructure seem to comply with a definite sample, particularly when evaluating the area exercise and identification of the 2.

Figure 15: A chart plotting daily page detections for Rockstar2FA and FlowerStorm through the end of November 2024
Determine 15: A chart plotting day by day web page detections for Rockstar2FA and FlowerStorm by means of the top of November 2024

From October 1 to November 11 the peaks and valleys of FlowerStorm and Rockstar Decoy web page detections and area registrations comply with a remarkably related pattern, usually rising and falling in tandem. This conduct might point out a shared infrastructure, overlapping operational aims, or coordinated timing between the 2 actions.
After November eleventh, the 2 patterns diverge:

  •  FlowerStorm begins to indicate stronger unbiased peaks, particularly round November 22–26
  • Rockstar Decoy web page exercise dwindles considerably after November 11, which is in step with the ceasing of operations beforehand talked about.

FlowerStorm concentrating on

The general nature of FlowerStorm as a paid phishing service signifies that FlowerStorm’s operators don’t select who will get focused for phishing assaults. That’s the choice of their prospects. However an evaluation of what actors are doing as soon as they’ve entry to the system will be helpful for defenders.

Based mostly on our detection data for FlowerStorm, the overwhelming majority of the targets chosen by FlowerStorm customers (84%) are in the USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and Italy. Organizations in the USA had been probably the most regularly focused, with over 60% of instances related to organizations primarily positioned inside the US. Canada was the subsequent most focused nation, at solely 8.96%. Total, 94% of the targets of FlowerStorm phishing makes an attempt Sophos has detected had been staff of North American and European organizations. Past these places, Singapore, India, Israel, New Zealand, and the United Arab Emirates make up the remaining 5% of targets.

Figure 16: The ten countries most targeted by attackers using FlowerStorm, based on Sophos detections
Determine 16: The ten international locations most focused by attackers utilizing FlowerStorm, based mostly on Sophos detections
Figure 17: The ten business sectors most targeted by attackers using FlowerStorm
Determine 17: The ten enterprise sectors most focused by attackers utilizing FlowerStorm

 

Essentially the most closely focused sector is the service trade, with explicit deal with companies offering engineering, development, actual property, and authorized providers and consulting.

 

Conclusions

We can not with excessive confidence hyperlink Rockstar2FA and FlowerStorm, aside from to notice that the kits replicate a typical ancestry at a minimal because of the related contents of the kits deployed The same patterns of area registration could possibly be a mirrored image of FlowerStorm and Rockstar working in coordination, although it is usually  potential that these matching patterns had been pushed by market forces greater than the platforms themselves. The diverging exercise post-November 11might replicate:

  • A strategic pivot in one of many teams
  • A change in personnel impacting operations
  • A disruption in shared infrastructure
  • A deliberate decoupling of operations to keep away from detection

Moreover, the fast ramp-up of FlowerStorm has led to some errors and misconfigurations of their operations which have allowed them to additionally simply be disrupted. These errors have additionally supplied us with a chance to extra intently study their back-end operations—which we’ll proceed to do.

An inventory of indicators of compromise associated to FlowerStorm is obtainable on Sophos X-Ops’ Github repository.

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